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Abstract
Almost two centuries ago Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
proposed social contracts – voluntary agreements
among free people – as a foundation from which an
egalitarian and just society can emerge. A digital so-
cial contract is the novel incarnation of this concept
for the digital age: a voluntary agreement between
people that is specified, undertaken, and fulfilled in
the digital realm. It embodies the notion of “code-is-
law” in its purest form, in that a digital social con-
tract is in fact a program – code in a social contracts
programming language, which specifies the digital ac-
tions parties to the social contract may take; and the
parties to the contract are entrusted, equally, with
the task of ensuring that each party abides by the
contract. Parties to a social contract are identified
via their public keys, and the one and only type of
action a party to a digital social contract may take
is a “crypto-speech act” – signing an utterance with
her private key and sending it to the other parties to
the contract.
Here, we present a formal definition of a digital so-
cial contracts as a transition system that specifies a
system of automata, one automaton per party, which
communicate asynchronously via crypto-speech acts,
where the output of each automaton is the input
of all the other automata. We outline an abstract
design for a social contracts programming language,
whose rules specify social contract transitions, and
show, via programming examples, that key applica-
tion areas, including social groups; simple sharing-
economy applications; egalitarian currency networks;
and democratic community governance, can all be ex-
pressed elegantly and efficiently as digital social con-
tracts. Social contracts may also include anonymous
agents, whose code is not dictating the possible ac-
tions of a natural person that is a party to the con-
tract, but rather is executed jointly by all parties to
the contract, similarly to so-called “smart contracts”.
A companion paper addresses the question of a dis-
tributed implementation of digital social contracts in
the presence of faulty agents, including the design of
a distributed fault-tolerant virtual machine for digi-
tal social contracts, its interface with the social con-
tracts programming language, and the programming
of fault-tolerance into digital social contracts. An-
other companion paper explores the application of
digital social contracts to realizing an egalitarian and
just cryptocurrency.
1 Introduction
Digital technology, as exemplified by social networks
and “sharing economy” platforms, has been the great
unequalizer: Making a few digital barons rich and
powerful, while keeping the multitudes performing
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digital labour (e.g., producing content and rating
products and services) for the benefit of the barons,
without compensation. Like feudal lords of yore, the
digital barons set their digital community’s rules of
conduct (legislative), their interpretation (judicial)
and implementation (executive), practicing surveil-
lance capitalism [17] and violating the dictum: “no
taxation without representation”. (We note that
users must have ticked a box saying they agree to
all this.) Digital social contracts are a novel incarna-
tion of the old but viable concept of social contracts;
we hope it would provide a foundation for an alter-
native to today’s array of feudal digital communities
– an egalitarian and just digital society.
Digital social contracts can be investigated using
multiple intellectual disciplines and can be described
at multiple levels of abstraction:
1. Philosophy, Political Theory: A digital so-
cial contract is the digital counterpart of so-
cial contracts, as envisioned almost two centuries
ago (1851) by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: “What
really is the Social Contract? An agreement
of the citizen with the government? No, that
would mean but the continuation of [Rousseau’s]
idea. The social contract is an agreement of
man with man; an agreement which must re-
sult in what we call society.” [10]. A digital so-
cial contract is a voluntary agreement between
people, which is specified, undertaken, and ful-
filled in the digital realm. Like Proudhon, we
aim for digital social contracts that are equal
(in sharing power) and just (in allocating re-
sources) among the people participating in the
contract. In the digital realm, equal sharing
of power, namely democratic governance, re-
quires mitigating sybils (fake and duplicate iden-
tities) [14]. Our team’s work on sybil-resilient
social choice [14] and sybil-resilient community
formation [9] provide a foundation for drafting
social contracts for forming, growing, and demo-
cratically governing egalitarian digital commu-
nities. Our companion work on egalitarian and
just currency networks [15] provides a foun-
dation for launching novel cryptocurrencies, in
which distributed and egalitarian coin minting
provides a form of Universal Basic Income to
the participants. Our companion paper on dis-
tributed fault-tolerant implementation of digital
social contracts [6] provides a foundation for dis-
tributed peer-to-peer software systems that may
realize digital social contracts on mobile phones.
Combined, digital social contracts may provide
a foundation from which an egalitarian and just
digital society may emerge.
2. Legal Theory: Digital social contracts embody
the notion of “code-is-law” [5] in its purest form,
in that a digital social contract is in fact a pro-
gram – code in a social contracts programming
language, which specifies the digital actions par-
ties to the social contract may take. Further-
more, there is no outside jurisdiction to such a
contract – the parties to the contract are en-
trusted, equally, with the task of ensuring that
each party abides by the contract. Naturally, one
of the actions that a party to a digital social con-
tract may take is the transmittal of a duly-signed
digital document that is legally binding in a spe-
cific jurisdiction (e.g. confirmation for a room
reservation). The recipient of such a document
may later choose to commence legal proceedings
in that jurisdiction against the signatory of the
document, but such a decision and proceedings
are outside the realm of digital social contracts.
3. Linguistics, Cryptography: A digital social
contract specifies the speech acts [11] parties to
the contract may take, possibly in response to
speech acts by the other parties, digitally. A
digital speech act by a party, defined herein,
is a sequentially-indexed and cryptographically-
signed utterance, sent to the other parties to the
contract. Cryptographic signatures of indexed
actions ensure, on the one hand, that their recip-
ient can identify the acting party and determine
the order of her actions and, on the other hand,
prevent the acting party from later repudiating
her actions or their order.
4. Mathematics of Computation: A digital so-
cial contract is an abstract model of computa-
tion, defined herein – a transition system that
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defines a set of interacting automata, one for
each party to the contract. Each automaton
is a nondeterministic, potentially infinite, state
transducer; its output is a string of digital speech
acts, and its input is the output strings of the
other automata. As a mathematical model of
computation, a transition system may be equiva-
lently defined by a program in suitable high-level
programming language, with which digital social
contracts may be easier to express, comprehend
and debug, as discussed next.
5. Programming Languages: A digital social
contract is a distributed nondeterministic pro-
gram in a Social Contracts Programming Lan-
guage, a conceptual design of which is presented
herein. A program in the language specifies the
roles of the parties to the contract and the rules
that govern their behavior. A program rule spec-
ifies an output action a party in a role may take,
given its state and an input action by another
party to the contract. Nondeterministic choices
in the program are presented as a query to the
human operator of the digital party: Which
room to book? What payment to make and
to whom? How to vote? And resolved accord-
ing to her answer. Digital social contracts can
be programmed for a variety of applications, in-
cluding social networks, political communities,
cryptocurrencies, and sharing economy, all po-
tentially endowed with democratic governance.
We present basic examples of social contracts in
these domain, expressed in the Social Contracts
Programming Language, illustrating their un-
derlying concepts as well as the expressive power
of the language.
6. Distributed Systems: A digital social con-
tract defines the possible interactions of a dis-
tributed group of agents equipped with a public-
key infrastructure and connected via a reli-
able asynchronous communication network, each
broadcasting digital speech acts and receiving
such from others, with a bounded fraction of
these agents possibly being faulty (Byzantine).
In a companion paper [6] we present a fault-
tolerant distributed transition system that im-
plements the abstract model of digital social con-
tract presented herein, given a bound on the
fraction of faulty agents; it provides the mathe-
matical foundation for a novel blockchain tech-
nology, discussed next.
7. Blockchain Technology: Digital social con-
tracts can be viewed as programs for a novel,
distributed, locally-replicated, asynchronous
blockchain architecture [6]. Agents are expected
to employ genuine identifiers [13] and function as
both actors and validators. An agent may par-
ticipate simultaneously in multiple social con-
tracts; similarly, each contract may have a dif-
ferent set of agents as parties; the result is a hy-
pergraph with agents as vertices and contracts as
hyperedges. Signed indexed transactions (digital
speech acts), carried out according to a contract,
are replicated only among parties to a contract,
who ratify them, and are synchronized indepen-
dently by each agent. A transaction carried out
according to a contract is finalized when rati-
fied by an appropriate supermajority of the par-
ties to the contract. A party to a contract is
typically an agent who embodies a natural per-
son via her genuine identifier, but, if determin-
istic, could also be an anonymous agent, which
functions algorithmically, similarly to a “smart
contract” of standard blockchains. Digital so-
cial contracts realize the blockchain paradigm of
“code is law” [5] in its purest form, in that a dig-
ital social contract is in fact a program – code in
a social contracts programming language, which
specifies the digital actions parties to the social
contract may take; and there is no outside juris-
diction to such a contract – the parties to the
contract are entrusted, equally, with the task
of ensuring that each party abides by the con-
tract. Parties to a social contract are identified
via their public keys, and the one and only type
of action a party to a digital social contract may
take is a “crypto-speech act” – signing an utter-
ance with her private key and sending it to the
other parties to the contract. A faulty party to a
social contract may deviate from the contract’s
program, e.g. if controlled by a malicious pro-
3
gram; but, if the number of faulty parties are
below the designated threshold, then faulty ac-
tions will never get finalized and the faulty party
will be identified and suspended.
8. Social Networks: Digital social contracts can
be a platform for sovereign, egalitarian and just
social networks. Sovereign, in that the social
network is operated by and under the full con-
trol of its members. Egalitarian, in that con-
trol is shared equally among the members. Just,
in that revenues, particularly from the con-
sumption of advertisements and commercial con-
tent, are disbursed directly to the members that
“labour” in producing the content that attracts
views and/or to the members consuming said ad-
vertisements and content. We present below sim-
ple example of such digital social contracts.
9. Cryptocurrencies: Digital social contracts
could be a platform for an egalitarian, just,
grassroots, and environmentally-friendly net-
work of cryptocurrencies [15], based on the no-
tion of genuine identifiers [13] and employing
a distributed, asynchronous and programmable
blockchain technology [6]. Such a cryptocur-
rency network will realize distributive justice
since coin minting is carried out equally by all
members, providing a form of Universal Basic
Income to each party to a currency contract.
10. Sharing Economy: Digital social contracts
can be a platform for an egalitarian and just
sharing economy. Using anonymous agents (aka
smart contracts) as aggregators and intermedia-
tors, communities of buyers and sellers, or of ser-
vice providers and consumers, can cooperate and
share the costs and benefits of aggregation and
intermediation. In existing “sharing economy”
platforms, the digital baron takes the rent for ag-
gregation and intermediation. Sharing-economy
digital cooperatives offer an alternative in which
rent is justly shared by the members of the coop-
erative, who also govern its operation, equally.
Role Actions
None
1. Initiate a group as a manager
2. Join a group as an member
Manager
1. Invite/remove a member
2. Do anything a member can do
Member
1. See the manager and members
2. See messages sent by others
3. Send a message
4. Leave the group
Table 1: The Group Social Contract.
1.1 Group: Example of a Digital So-
cial Contract
A simple, useful example of a digital social contract
is a social group. Existing solutions for group com-
munication rely on servers controlled by the service
provider, which undermine the sovereignty of the
group, let alone its privacy. The group digital social
contract has roles and actions as detailed in Table 1.
It specifies a private social group, of which the man-
ager is the sovereign; anyone can accept, reject or
ignore an invitation to become a member in a group.
Turning this autocratic digital social contract into an
egalitarian one is discussed herein.
1.2 Related Work
The concepts and design presented here are rem-
iniscent of the notions of blockchains [16], smart
contracts [1], and their programming languages [2].
Hand-in-hand with these we are working on egalitar-
ian currency networks [15], an egalitarian and just
alternative to existing plutocratic cryptocurrencies
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such as Bitcoin [7] and Ethereum [2].
A fundamental tenet of our design is that social
contracts are made between people who know and
trust each other, directly or indirectly via other peo-
ple that they know and trust. This is in stark contrast
to the design of cryptocurrencies and their associated
smart contracts, which are made between anonymous
and trustless accounts. A challenge cryptocurrencies
address is how to achieve consensus in the absence of
trust, and their solution is based on proof-of-work [3]
or, more recently, proof-of-stake [8] protocols. In con-
trast, social contracts are between known and trust-
worthy individuals, each expected to posses a gen-
uine (unique and singular) identifier [13] (see therein
discussion on how this can be ensured). Hence, a dif-
ferent approach can be taken. In our approach, the
integrity of the ledger of actions taken by the parties
to the social contract is preserved internally, among
the parties to the agreement, not between external
anonymous “miners”, as in cryptocurrencies. This
gives rise to a much simpler approach to fault toler-
ance.
In particular, and as discussed in the companion
paper [6] our approach does not suffer from forks/de-
layed finality as for example the Bitcoin protocol [7],
and does not need to reach Byzantine Agreement [4].
Instead, agents ratify actions of each other; an action
is final when a supermajority of the agents ratify it;
and agents take an action that depends on actions
of others only once they are final. A consequence of
our approach is that the handling of “double spend”,
the key challenge for cryptocurrencies, is simpler: At
most one, but possibly none, of the double actions is
finalized, and the agent taking the double action is
eventually declared faulty, resulting in further non-
final actions of that agent being ignored.
1.3 Paper Structure
Next we describe a formal, descriptive model for dig-
ital social contracts, as well as a possible design for
a programming language to program social contracts
in Section 2. We then outline several examples of so-
cial contracts in Section 3; specifically, we describe a
general design using the programming language for
three broad settings: social networks, shared econ-
omy and sovereign currencies. We then discuss the
realization egalitarian social contracts (Section 3 and
democratic governance (Section 4).
2 Digital Social Contracts
Here we describe a formal model for digital social
contracts. Note that we assume that all agents are
non-faulty. A companion paper [6] addresses faulty
agents.
2.1 Preliminaries
We assume a given finite set of agents V , each associ-
ated with a genuine (unique and singular) [13] iden-
tifier, which is also a public key of a key-pair.1 We
expect agents to be realized by computer programs
operating on personal devices (e.g. smartphones) of
people. Hence, we refer to agents as “it” rather than
as he or she.
We identify an agent v ∈ V with its genuine public
identifier, and denote by v(s) the result of agent v
signing the string s ∈ S with the private key corre-
sponding to v. We assume computational hardness
of the public-key system, namely that signatures of
an agent with a given identifier cannot be produced
without possessing the private key corresponding to
this identifier. To avoid notational clutter we do not
distinguish between finite mathematical entities and
their string representation. Identifying agents with
their genuine identifiers makes V totally ordered (by
the numeric value of the identifier, namely the public
key) and hence allows defining tuples and Cartesian
products indexed by V . If t is a tuple indexed by V ,
then we use t[v] to refer to the vth element of t. We
say that t′ = t, except for t′[v] := x, to mean that the
tuple t′ is obtained from t by replacing its vth element
by x. In particular, if t[v] is a sequence, then we say
that t′ = t, except for t′[v] := t[v] · x, to mean that
t′ is obtained from t by appending x to the sequence
t[v].
1We identify the set of agents V with the set of parties to
the agreement. Extensions will allow an agent to be a party to
multiple agreements, and different agreements to have different
sets of agents as parties.
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All agents are assumed to be connected via a reli-
able asynchronous communication network (without
assuming a known time limit on message arrival), and
require all messages to be authenticated. Informally,
the only things an agent can do as a party to a dig-
ital social contract are (i) perform a crypto-speech
act [13], defined next; (ii) observe crypto-speech acts
performed by others; and (iii) change internal state.2
Definition 1 (Crypto-Speech Act, v-act). Given a
set of agents V , a crypto-speech act of agent v ∈
V consists of (i) signing an utterance (text string)
s, resulting in m = v(s); and (ii) broadcasting the
message m to V . We refer to a crypto-speech act by
v resulting in the signed action m as the v-act m,
and let M be the set of all v-acts for all v ∈ V .
We employ a standard notion of a transition sys-
tem:
Definition 2 (Transition System). A transition sys-
tem TS = (S, s0, T ) consists of a set of states S,
an initial state s0 ∈ S, and a set of transitions T ,
T ⊆ S × S, with (s, s′) ∈ T written as s −→ s′. The
set s → ∗ = {sˆ | s −→ sˆ ∈ T} is the outgoing transi-
tions of s. A run of TS is a sequence of transitions
r = s0 −→ s1 −→ . . . from the initial state.
2.2 Digital Social Contracts
Here we define digital social contracts in the abstract,
in the sense that they do not address distributed real-
ization nor agent faults. The former will be addressed
subsequently, the latter in a companion paper.
Remark 1 (Parameterized Social Contracts).
Agents should be able to participate simultaneously
in multiple social contracts. Furthermore, a contract
may have multiple parties with the exact same role.
To address this properly, we should describe digital
social contracts as a set of roles, each specified by
a parameterized procedure, and bind the formal pa-
rameters to actual agent identifiers upon execution of
2While the formal definition allows a crypto-speech act to
employ an arbitrary string, its intended use is to take mean-
ingful actions. As parties to a social contract employ strings
that are meaningful to the other parties, we believe we do not
conjure “speech acts” in vain.
the contract. This is akin to the standard legal prac-
tice of using a textual contract template, with role
names as parameters (e.g. Landlord, Tenant), and
filling in the identities of the parties assuming these
roles in an instance of this contract template upon its
signature. We defer this distinction between formal
and actual parameters in a social contract to avoid
notational clutter, and name the parties to the social
contract by their genuine identifiers, i.e. their pub-
lic keys. A practical social contracts programming
language, which we expect to design and implement,
will naturally make this distinction.
We assume a given set of actions A. In the follow-
ing, actions performed by an agent are first indexed
and then signed. Signing an action by an agent v
makes the action non-repudiated by v. Signing in-
dexed actions also makes the order of the actions
of v non-repudiated by v. All that a party to a
digital social contract does, then, is perform a se-
quence of indexed crypto-speech acts, resulting in a
non-repudiated personal history of the acts, defined
next. In the automata view of a social contract, the
personal history of a agent is its output tape, which
is also the input tape of all the other agents.
Definition 3 (Personal History). A personal history
of v ∈ V is a finite sequence of v-acts m0,m1, . . .mn,
n ∈ N , of signed indexed actions mi = v((i, ai)),
i ∈ [n], ai ∈ A, a0 = genesis. The set of all personal
histories of v is denoted by Hv.
The following definition formalizes the notion of a
ledger of a digital social contract, which is but a set of
the personal histories of the parties to the contract.
Definition 4 (Ledger). A ledger l ∈ L is a tuple
of personal histories indexed by the agents V , L :=×v∈V Hv. In such a ledger l, l[v] ∈ Hv is v’s personal
history in l.
Note that each agent independently indexes its own
messages, so a ledger is not a linear data structure,
like a blockchain, but a tuple of independent per-
sonal histories, each of them being a linear sequence
of actions (a string, or a tape). Relating this model
to finite state transducers, think of l[v], the personal
history of v, v ∈ V , as a tape that is both the output
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tape of v and an input tape of all other agents/au-
tomata u 6= v ∈ V . These automata are commu-
nicating in the sense that the output of one is the
input of all others, and asynchronous in that each
automaton reads its input tapes, namely the output
tapes of all the others, independently of the others –
at a different pace and possibly at a different relative
order.
Remark 2. Note that in the present asynchronous
model, neither personal histories nor ledgers have a
built-in notion of time. We would like, however, so-
cial contracts to be able to have a notion of time and
refer to it. Adding time to digital social contracts is
an anticipated future extension.
In automata-theoretic terms, the ledger l repre-
sents the portion of the tapes that were already read
by v (l[u], u 6= v ∈ V ) and written by v (l[v]).
Definition 5 (Agent Transition). Given a ledger l ∈
L and an agent v ∈ V , a v-transition l −→ l′ ∈ L × L
satisfies one of the following:
1. Input(m): l′ = l except for l′[u] := l[u] ·m for
some (|l[u]|+ 1)-indexed u-act m, u 6= v ∈ V .
2. Output(m): l′ = l except for l′[v] := l[v] ·m for
some (|l[v]|+ 1)-indexed v-act m. In which case
we say that l enables the v-act m.
A ledger l of agent v and an input and output v-
transitions are depicted in Figure 1.
Definition 6 (Ledgers Configuration, Consistent,
Diagonal). A ledgers configuration L is a V -indexed
tuple of ledgers, L ∈ L|V |, with L[v, u] as synonym
to L[v][u], both denoting the personal history of u
as recorded in the ledger of v in the ledgers config-
uration L. A ledgers configuration L is consistent if
for every u, v ∈ V , Lu[v]  Lv[v], namely the record
of v’s personal history in u’s ledger in L is a prefix
of v’s actual personal history, as recorded in v’s per-
sonal ledger in L. The diagonal of L, ~L, is the ledger
defined by ~L[v] := Lv[v] for every v ∈ V .
In the automata view of social contracts, a ledgers
configuration records the output tape of each agent,
where the writing head of an agent is always next to
Figure 1: Agent States, Transitions and Programs: A
v-act mi, a personal history, a ledger l, an input tran-
sition (blue) inputs the u-act m, adding it to the per-
sonal history l[u] of u in l; an output transition (red)
that outputs the v-act m′, adding it to the personal
history l[v] of v in l, resulting in l′, changes the ledger
of v from l (to left of grey line) to l′ (to left of blue
or red line, respectively). The Input transition fol-
lowed by the Output transition can be abbreviated
in a social contract program by a rule S,m −→ m′, S′,
in which S summarizes l and S′ summarizes l′ (blue
and red combined).
7
its last output, as well as the location of the reading
heads of all agents, where the reading head of agent
v, reading the output tape of agent u, is after the
last symbol of L[v, u], which is always a prefix of the
output tape of u, L[u, u].
Observation 1 (Consistency and the Diagonal). A
ledgers configuration L is consistent iff L[v]  ~L for
every v ∈ V .
Namely, a social contract state is consistent iff all
personal ledgers are prefixes of the “true” diagonal
ledger.
Definition 7 (Digital Social Contract). A digital so-
cial contract SC = (S, T ) is a transition system with
ledgers configurations as states S ⊆ L|V |, initial state
L0 := Λ
|V |, and transitions T ⊆ L|V | × L|V |, where
T =
⋃
v∈V Tv, and for each L −→ L′ ∈ Tv, L and L′
are consistent and L′ = L except for L′[v], which is
the result of a v-transition L[v] −→ L′[v].
Note that consistency of L′ requires that an input
v-transition does not “invent” an input u-act m; v
can only employ as input a u-act that has already
been taken by u. Furthermore, it can only input ac-
tions in the order in which they were performed. If v
takes as input a u-act m which u has not taken yet,
or is if m out-of-order, and records m in the history
of u in its personal ledger L[v, u], this will result in
an inconsistent ledgers configuration, as L[v, u] will
no longer be a prefix L[u, u] and hence not a prefix
of the diagonal ~L.
This completes the definition of the computational
model of Digital Social Contracts. Its distributed
fault-tolerant implementation is discussed in a com-
panion paper [6].
2.3 A Social Contracts Programming
Language
Here we outline a design of a social contract program-
ming language. Abstractly, a transition of an agent
depends on its personal ledger, namely a record of
the crypto-speech acts of the parties to the contract
the agent has input and output. To be practical, such
a history is condensely summarized in the local state
of the agent. The state can change as a result of an
input and/or output transition.
Hence we view the program of an agent v as con-
sisting of a set of rules of the following form:
S,m −→ m′, S′, if Conditions.
where S is the internal state of v, m is a u-act
by some u ∈ V received by an input transition of
v, m′ is a v-act taken by an output transition of v,
S′ is the updated internal state of v, and Conditions
are any conditions on S, m, m′, and S′, that are
required for the input and output transitions to take
place. Note that degenerate rules, i.e., rules that do
not involve input or output, are of course possible.
The informal operational semantics of such a rule is
given in Figure 1. We note that the local state S of
the agent v is a digest of its personal ledger l. In
particular, if the rules of v have finitely many states,
this means that the v has only limited memory and
hence cannot “look back” arbitrary deeply into its
ledger.
If we were to use a syntax closer to conventional
procedural programming languages, then a smart
contracts program might look like this:
when in S:
upon m1, if Conditions -> m’,S’;
upon m2, if Conditions -> m’,S’;
when in S2:
upon ...
However, since we wish to retain the close relation
between program rules and transitions, as well as the
modularity that comes with this notation, we will
stick with the rule-based notation in this paper.
The program of an agent is nondeterministic, in
the sense that, if several rules are enabled by a given
state and message, then any one of them may be cho-
sen. The intention of this design is that this nonde-
terminism be resolved by the person operating the
computational agent: Abstractly, a nondeterministic
choice faced by an agent would use the person op-
erating the agent represents as its oracle in making
the nondeterministic choice. Concretely, when faced
with a nondeterministic choice, an agent would user
a structured dialogue box to present the person oper-
ating it (the “user”) with a query, and the user would
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respond with her answer, the choice. This notion of
nondeterminism as user interface and the user as the
nondeterministic oracle will be made clearer via the
examples below.
3 Examples of Digital Social
Contracts
In this section we demonstrate the concepts and util-
ity of digital social contracts via examples. These
examples sketch highly simplified settings in which
social contracts may allow agents to interact, and
may be partitioned to three main thematic categories:
social networks, shared economy, and sovereign cur-
rencies. The significance of social contracts stems
from the fact that they allow the agents to retain
the sovereignty, transparency, and privacy over the
medium of interaction.
While we depict a direct interaction among the
agents in each of these settings, a natural next step is
the consideration of intermediators as market aggre-
gators or brokers that may ease the interaction. Ini-
tially, these intermediators can be presented as nat-
ural agents, but later, ideally, they should be anony-
mous agents (aka smart contracts) that are operated
by the community and for the benefit of the commu-
nity. The use of anonymous agents operated jointly
by the entire community, allows arbitrage profits to
be shared among all members. More generally, we
can have a buyers cooperative and a sellers cooper-
ative, each as a separate social contract. Such co-
operatives may decide to transact, so that there is a
network of transacting buyer and seller cooperatives.
We leave the exploration of anonymous agents to fu-
ture work.
3.1 An Online Lodging Marketplace
Here we show an Airnbn-like social contract. It is
highly simplified, just to illustrate the concept:
1. There is a bunch of tourists and a bunch of hosts;
initially all hosts are free.
2. A tourist may request a room from a host and
wait; if the room is free, then the host grants the
request and records the room as booked; if the
room is booked, then the host denies the request.
3. If the request is granted, then the tourist checks
in, and then checks out; when the tourist checks
out, the host records that the room is free. If the
request is denied, then the tourist may request a
room again, from the same host or from another
host.
4. No money exchange here.
Here is the Simple-Airbnb social contract. The ac-
tions are messages of the form (Addresee, Content).
These messages are contract-level speech acts, visible
to all parties, although in the Simple-Airbnb social
contract program they are ignored by all parties ex-
cept the addressee.
First, the host v: The state of the host v can
be either Host(v) – in which v’s room is free; or
Booked(v,u) – in which u currently lives in v’s room.
If an Host(v) received a reserve request, it grants it,
and becomes Booked. When the agent that reserved
the room checks out, the the booked owner becomes
Host(v) again. Here are the rules of the host v:
Program 1: Host
Host(v), (v,u(reserve)) -->
(u,v(granted)), Booked(v,u).
Booked(v,u), (v,u(checkout)) --> Host(v).
Booked(v,u), (v,w(reserve)) -->
(w,v(denied)), Booked(v,u).
Now, the tourist v: The state of the tourist v can
be either Tourist(v) – in which v currently does
not live in any room; Waiting(v,u) – in which v is
waiting for u’s answer to v’s request for u’s room;
or Renting(v,u) – in which v currently lives in u’s
room.
Here are the rules for a tourist v: The first two
rules are of the form S --> m′, S′, i.e., missing an in-
coming message m, so this rule can apply whenever
v’s state is S. Note that a Tourist nondeterministi-
cally chooses a room owner to reserve a room from.
In our interpretation, this nondeterminism is realized
as a query to the person operating this agent, which
room would you like to reserve? If and when the
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person chooses which room u to reserve, the agent
then requests to reserve the room, sending the mes-
sage (u, v(reserve)). The agent then waits for the
response. If the reservation is granted it checks in
at its leisure. If the request is denied, it may choose
again a room owner to reserve from.
Program 2: Tourist
Tourist(v) -->
(u, v(reserve)), Waiting(v,u).
Waiting(v,u), (v, u(denied)) -->
Tourist(v).
Waiting(v,u), (v, u(granted)) -->
Renting(v,u).
Renting(v,u) -->
(u, v(checkout)), Tourist(v).
This ends the program description. We now add a
broker that accumulates a list of reservations and a
list of free rooms, assume that all rooms are equiv-
alent, and grants reservations on a first-come-first-
served basis, under certain fairness assumptions (to
be spelled out subsequently[?]). As the broker has to
maintain a list of reservations and a list of available
hosts, we use the Prolog list notation, with [] (read
“nil”) denoting the empty list, and [x—xs] denoting
a list with the first element x and the rest of the list
xs.
Program 3: Brokered Hosts/Tourists Social
Contract
Host(v) --> v(free), Free(v).
Free(v), broker(granted(v,u)) -->
Booked(v,u).
Booked(v,u), (v,u(checkout)) -->
v(free), Free(v).
Tourist(v) --> v(reserve), Waiting(v).
Waiting(v), broker(granted(u,v)) -->
Renting(v,u).
Renting(v,u) -->
(u, v(checkout)), Tourist(v).
Broker(broker) --> Broker(broker,[],[]).
Broker(broker,Rooms,Reservations), v(free)
-->
Broker(broker,Rooms’,Reservations)
if Rooms’ is the result of appending
v to Rooms.
Broker(broker,Rooms,Reservations),
v(reserve) -->
Broker(broker,Rooms,Reservations’)
if Reservations’ is the result of
appending v to Reservations.
Broker(broker,Rooms,Reservations) -->
broker(granted(u,v)),
Broker(broker,Rooms’,Reservations’)
if Rooms = [u|Rooms’],
Reservations = [v|Reservations’].
This is not far from how Airbnb operates. With a
broker, one may have two separate social contracts.
One among room owners and the broker (Airnbn),
and one among the tourists and the broker (Airnbn
again). The broker, then, is a party to both social
contracts. The broker may receive a confirmation
signed by the room owner via the social contract of
the owners, and forward it to the tourist, via the
tourists social contract. Such a signed confirmation
is non-repudiated, even if obtained indirectly. Third,
one may add payments, as in real life. Realizing
a currency network using digital social contracts is
described in a companion paper [15]. However, in
our realization, the broker need not collect rent from
transactions among the tourists and the room own-
ers, as Airbnb does. It could be owned and operated
cooperatively by the tourists, by the owners, or by
both. The issue of shared, anonymous agents (aka
smart contracts) will be discussed in detail in a sub-
sequent paper. Also, in this paper we have eschewed
the programming language design issue of how to
bind formal parameters to actual parameters in a
social contract, parameter scope, and how to start
a social contract. These are standard issues of pro-
gramming language design, but fixing these details
in this high-level paper is premature. The following
muck-up code, without formal semantics yet, may il-
lustrate a design option, assuming all names stand
for public keys, for which the private keys are known
by the respective agents.
Program 4: Initiating a Brokered Hosts/-
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Tourists Social Contract
Start -->
Broker(broker), Host(joe), Host(mary),
Tourist(john), Tourist(sue).
3.2 A Simple Data Storage Service
A similar example of rental goods is a distributed
data storage (cloud) service. Here is a simplified set-
ting:
1. There are a bunch of users and a bunch of data
storage owners; initially all storage spaces are
free.
2. A user may request some storage space (to store
his data) from an owner and wait; if some space
is free, then the owner grants the request, pos-
sibly partially, and records the granted space as
booked; if the space is booked, then the owner
denies the request.
3. If the request is granted, then the user stores
her data, and then checks out; when the user
checks out, the owner records that the space is
free. If the request is denied, then the user may
request a space again, from the same owner or
from another owner.
4. No money exchange here.
The social contract for this setting is similar to the
unbrokered hosts/tourists setting, with the addition
that a reservation requests capacity, and can be sat-
isfied fully or partially. In the brokered setting, there
is an added complication that requests can be satis-
fied in fractions, so leftover storage factions for both
users and hosts should be managed.
3.3 An Online Commerce Example
Here we outline a simple Amazon-like social contract.
This instance may be viewed as a market, operated
by the agents, where buyers and sellers may interact.
Consider the following:
1. There is a bunch of buyers and a bunch of room
sellers; Each seller has some goods.
2. A buyer may request to buy a certain good from
a seller; if seller has this good in his inventory,
then he grants the request; Else, he denies the
request.
3. If the request is granted, then the seller records
the deal, updates his inventory and provides a re-
ciept to the buyer. If the request is denied, then
the buyer may request to buy the good again,
from the same seller or from another seller.
4. No money exchange here.
Program 5: Online Commerce
% Buyer can ask to buy from v
% Then, Buyer waits
Buyer(v) --> (u, v(buy)), Wait(v, u).
% If declined, cease to wait
Wait(v, u), u(decline) --> Buyer(v).
% If accepted, cease to wait
Wait(v, u), u(accept) --> Buyer(v).
% i is the number of items seller has
% Seller can add more goods
Seller(u, i) --> Seller(u, i’).
% If no goods, decline
Seller(u, 0), (u, v(buy)) -->
Seller(u, 0), (v, u(decline)).
Seller(u, i), (u, v(buy)) -->
Seller(u, i - 1), (v, u(accept)).
The contract can similarly incorporate an aggre-
gator (like Amazon), that receives order from buyers
and inventories from sellers, and matches one with
the other.
3.4 Citizens Band and Social Group
Examples
Here we consider the situation that an agent wishes
to set a private social group among a subset of the
agents.
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Remark 3. In the following, we place inside [square
brackets] text that hints at the privacy-related cryp-
tographic measures that we intend any implementa-
tion to employ. Such text can be skipped without
loss of continuity.
Since each agent, in the social group we wish to
program here, has its own key pair to begin with, it
is possible to set up a secret channel among any set of
agents using standard cryptographic techniques. So
here we assume that there is a group name [which is a
key-pair] that can be sent [securely] from one agent to
another, and that agents that know the group name
may communicate [privately] with each other. The
social contract focuses on the creation, management,
and use of such groups.
The first group we describe is a simple broadcast
(Citizens Band) channel. In it, every agent may cre-
ate a new channel. Every agent that knows the name
of a channel, may broadcast a message to it, receive
messages from it, and invite others to it. For simplic-
ity of presentation we restrict agents to have at most
one channel, and then generalize.
The states of agent v are:
• Agent(v): Agent v is not (yet) a party to any
channel.
• AgentCB(v,channel): Agent v is a party to
channel channel.
Here are the rules for an agent v (some of these
rules depend on an incoming message m, while some
do not):
Program 6: Citizens Band
% create a channel for some
% new channel [key pair].
Agent(v) --> AgentCB(v,channel)
% invite u to a channel
AgentCB(v,channel) -->
(u,invite(channel)), AgentCB(v,channel)
% accept or ignore invite
Agent(v), (v,invite(channel)) -->
AgentCB(v,channel).
Agent(v), (v,invite(channel)) -->
Agent(v).
% send message with content
AgentCB(v, channel) -->
message(channel, v, content),
AgentCB(v, channel).
% receive message with content
AgentCB(v, channel),
message(channel, u, content) -->
AgentCB(v, channel).
Generalizing to many channels requires an agent
to maintain a list of channels, allowing an agent to
create a new channel and add it to its list, invite other
agents to any channel in its list, and send or receive
a message on any channel in its list.
We now show the social contract of a social private
group. For simplicity, we assume that the group has
one manager, its founder, that each agent can be a
member of at most one group, and that an agent
invited to become a member in a group accepts the
invitation. First we describe group creation, joining,
and use:
Program 7: Social Group
% create a new group [key pair]
Agent(v) --> Manager(v,group,[],[])
for some new group.
% join a group
Agent(v), (v,u(invite(group))) -->
Member(v,group,u).
% invite u
Manager(v,group,invited,members) -->
(u,v(invite(name))),
Manager(v,name,[u|invited],members)
Manager(v,name,invited,members),
(v,u(accept(name))) -->
% add u to the group
Manager(v,name,invited’,members’)
if add(u,invited,
members,invited’,members’).
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% send a message with content
Member(v,group,u) -->
message(group,v,content),
Member(v,group,u).
% receive a message from w
Member(v,group,u),
message(group,w,content) -->
Member(v,group,u).
add(u,invited,members,invited’,members’) is a
simple list-processing routine that removes u from the
invited list to the members list, resulting in updated
lists invited’ and members’.
Removing a member is a bit more involved. The
social contract may specify that if the group’s man-
ager removes a member, then the member excludes
itself from the group, for example as below:
Program 8: Removing a Member
Manager(v,group,invited,members) -->
% remove u from the group
(u,v(uninvite(name))),
Manager(v,name,invited],members’)
if remove(u,members,members’).
% leave the group.
Member(v,group,u),
(v,u(uninvite(group))) -->
Agent(v).
However, even if the member is non-faulty, it may
delay its response to the message, in the absence
of some further fairness (in the concurrency theory
sense) and responsiveness requirements on the exe-
cution of social contracts. Furthermore, even if the
agent removes itself, it may still keep, or disclose,
the group’s name [key pair], allowing itself or others
to eavesdrop on the group conversations. Hence, to
maintain the privacy of a group after the removal of
a member, the group needs a new name [key pair],
which can be easily communicated [securely] to each
of the remaining members by the manager. Here is
the revised social contract that realizes this. The
details of [securely] sending a message with the new
name to each member of the group are spared.
Program 9: Safely Removing a Member
% remove u from the group,
% change group’s name
Manager(v,group,invited,members) -->
(u,v(uninvite(group))),
Rename(v,group,group’,invited,members’) if
remove(u,members,members’).
Rename(v,group,group’,invited,members) -->
Send [securely] the message
rename(v,group’) to all members,
Manager(v,group’,invited,members).
Member(v,group,u), (v,u(rename(group))) -->
Member(v,group’,u).
Allowing agents to be members in many groups can
be realized as discussed above for open channels.
3.5 Egalitarian Currency Example
Here we describe a social contract for a simple egal-
itarian currency. In this contract, there is a clock
agent, that sends clock ticks, that is, a sequence of
tick messages. The parties to the agreement start
with a zero balance of coins, and every clock tick,
each party may mint one coin. In addition, a party
may pay another party any amount not greater than
its balance.
Program 10: Single Egalitarian Currency
% the clock keeps ticking
clock --> tick, clock.
start --> Agent(x), Agent(z), clock.
% start with zero balance
Agent(v) --> Agent(v,0).
% mint one coin every clock tick
Agent(v,balance), tick -->
Agent(v,balance+1).
% pay to another agent,
% less than the balance
Agent(v,balance) -->
pay(v,u,x), Agent(v,balance-x)
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if balance >= x.
% receive a payment from another agent
Agent(v,balance), pay(u,v,x) -->
Agent(v,balance+x).
Here is the code for a member in an egalitarian
currency network. It assumes that each agent v is
initialized with a list of pairs of the form (c,0) where
c is the name of a currency and the initial balance is
zero.
Program 11: Egalitarian Currency Network
S(v,cs), tick --> mint(v,c), S(v,cs’),
where (c,b) in cs, cs’ obtained from cs
by replacing (c,b) by (c,b+1).
% mint a c coin
Within this network, we show an implementation
of an atomic swap between two currencies. In a
swap(v,c1,c2,x), agent v burns x c1 coins and mints
the same amount of c2 coins.
Program 12: Atomic Swap: Burning coins of
one currency and minting coins of another
% burn x c1 coins and mint x c2 coins
S(v,cs) --> swap(v,c1,c2,x), S(v,cs’),
if balance of c1 in cs is
greater or equal to x,
and cs’ is obtained from cs
by subtracting x from c1
and adding x to c2.
4 Egalitarian Governance of
Social Contracts
The examples up to this point allow agents to realize
sovereignty, transparency, and privacy over a shared
medium of interaction. Here, we focus on equality,
and discuss several aspects of egalitarian governance
of social contracts.
4.1 Egalitarian Records and Execu-
tion
This aspect of equality relates to the authorization to
record and execute a social contract. In that sense,
equality among a given community means that all in-
dividuals obtain the original contract and have equal
authority to execute the contract. A correct imple-
mentation of the abstract model of digital social con-
tracts must ensure this, as realized, for example, in
the implementation described in the companion pa-
per on a distributed fault-tolerant transition system
that implements digital social contracts.
4.2 Equality in Voting
Here we consider the standard principle of democ-
racy, generally abbreviated as “one person, one vote”.
That is, we show how a community may form demo-
cratically. This method of democratic community
formation could be applied to any of the social con-
tracts mentioned above - the Social Group, Hosts and
Tourists, and Egalitarian Currency. Here decisions
to add or remove a member are taken by a simple
majority, but extending the contract to require a su-
permajority for taking a decision is not difficult.
Note that this is a very simple program, in partic-
ular as (1) there is no option to decline an invitation
(2) agents must wait for other agents to vote. Indeed,
we provide the program mainly as a proof of concept,
but to implement a practical democratic decision pro-
cess, more complex program is needed. We also note
that votes are public to the group members and are
not anonymous.
Program 13: Chaired Democratic Community
% make a proposal and vote for it
Chair(v,members) -->
ballot(proposal,members,1),
Chair_wait(v,members),
if proposal = Add(u)
and u is not in members,
or proposal = Remove(u)
and u is in members.
% invite if proposal accepted
Chair_wait(v,members),
ballot(Add(u),[],result) -->
invite(u,members), Chair(v,[u|members]),
if result > 0.
% remove if proposal accepted
Chair_wait(v,members),
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ballot(Remove(u),[],result) -->
Chair(v,members’),
if result > 0 and
removing u from members gives members’.
% proposal declined
Chair_wait(v,members),
ballot(proposal,[],result) -->
Chair(v,members),
if result =< 0.
% accept invitation
Agent(v), invite(v,members) -->
Member(v,members).
% vote on proposal
Member(v,members),
ballot(proposal,[v|rest],vote) -->
ballot(proposal,rest,vote+myvote),
Member(v,members),
where myvote is 1 (for),
-1 (against),
or 0.
% proposal to add accepted
Member(v,members),
ballot(Add(u),[],result) -->
Member(v,[u|members]),
if result > 0.
% proposal to remove other accepted
Member(v,members),
ballot(Remove(u),[],result) -->
Member(v,members’),
if result > 0 and u =/= v
and removing u from members
gives members’.
% proposal to remove self accepted
Member(v,members),
ballot(Remove(v),[],result) -->
Agent(v)
if result > 0.
4.3 Equality in Determining the Pro-
posals to Vote Upon
So far, only the chair can propose to add or remove
a member. Now we add the ability of members to
do so. If a member makes a proposal, and another
member seconds it, then the proposal is put for a
vote.
Typically, in a direct democracy like Switzerland,
citizens can also use a petition mechanism to add a
topic to the agenda, but not to remove one. So, in
general, in a direct democracy citizens do not have
control over the agenda. The computational founda-
tion for the realization of this aspect of equality is
proposed in our paper on vote and proposal aggrega-
tion in metric spaces [12].
Program 14: Democratic Community with
Member’s Proposals
% if a proposal is seconded, the chair
% puts the proposal for a vote
% and votes on it.
Chair(v,members),
seconded(u,w,proposal) -->
ballot(proposal,members,myvote),
Chair_wait(v,members),
where myvote is 1 (for),
-1 (against),
or 0.
% make a proposal
Member(v,members) -->
propose(v,Add(u)),
Member(v,members),
if u is not in members.
Member(v,members) -->
propose(v,Remove(u)),
Member(v,members),
if and u is in members.
% second a proposal if you feel like it
Member(v,members), propose(u,proposal) -->
seconded(v,u,proposal),
Member(v,members),
if u =/=v.
15
4.4 Equality in Chairmanship
With a simple addition, members can propose to re-
place the Chair:
Program 15: Democratically Replacing the
Chair
% Chair steps down
Chair_wait(v,members),
ballot(New_Chair(u),[],result) -->
Member(v,members),
if result > 0.
% Elected Member becomes a Chair
Member(v,members),
ballot(New_Chair(v),[],result) -->
Chair(v,members),
if result > 0.
% Member proposes a new Chair
Member(v,members) -->
propose(v,New_Chair(u)),
Member(v,members),
if u is in members.
We note that there is a key issue with electing a
chair as it undermines equality by granting author-
ity to a single individual, as in a typical represen-
tative democracy. However, once agents determine
the agenda, the role of the chair is purely ceremonial
and it involves no discretion, and thus may poten-
tially (and ideally) be automated. However, several
forms of discretion remains, namely how to resolve
ties among proposals made at the same time, as well
as issues with faulty or mal-functioning chair (e.g.,
where the chair is asleep/dies/runs out of battery).
These issues may potentially be resolved via solutions
of fault-tolerant anonymous agents, discussed below.
4.5 Fault Tolerant Anonymous
Agents
Implementing an anonymous community aggregator
(chair, mediator, aggregator, delegate) requires a so-
lution to a standard problem in asynchronous sys-
tems: merge or serialization. The entire Nakamoto
protocol is dedicated to global fault-tolerant serial-
ization of all actions by all agents (in all smart con-
tracts). Since we work in a different framework, se-
rialization is typically required only for some actions
of some agents within a specific social contract. The
issue, in general, is achieving fault-tolerant and fair
merge. The issue is as follows. An anonymous agent
such as an aggregator/chair can be realized similarly
to a smart contract: A deterministic program that is
run by all agents, so there is no single point of fail-
ure and all non-faulty agents can easily agree on its
outcome/behavior. But, if the anonymous agent in-
teracts with multiple agents, there is indeterminism
of message arrival. The purpose of a fault-tolerant
fair merge is to provide a ”black box” that is fault-
tolerant and hides this indeterminism. Its specifica-
tion and implementation will be discussed in a sub-
sequent paper.
5 Outlook
We have introduced the concept of digital social con-
tracts, provided a mathematical definition of them,
outlined a design for a social contracts programming
language, and demonstrated its social utility via pro-
gram examples. Much remain to be done; some is
discussed in companion papers [6, 15].
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